USA Ground Operations CIL Sheet AUG 2 3 1999

Critical Item: Valve, Check

NASA Part No: None

Criticality Category: 18

Total Quantity: 1

Mfg/Part No:

The Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co / Model 4E

System:

Facility Water System

Find No.	Qty	Qty Area PMN Baseline Drawing			
A526704 (V-566)	1	Pad-A	K61-3288	007.00	79K06011 / 7

Function:

Prevents ECLSS Support Station Firex water from flowing back into the water supply line.

Failure Mode No. Failure Mode	Failure Cause Failure Effect	Detection Method Time to Effect	Crit Cat
09SY03A-001,014	Corrosion, contamination, or structural failure of		
	internal piece part.	None	15
Fail closed	memai piece part.	1	
	No firey water waste by	Immediate	
	No firex water would be supplied to the ECLSS	ł	
	Support Station Area. Possible loss of life and/or		
	vehicle during a hazardous condition.		

ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE

Design:

- NFPA approved standard configuration.
- Rated working pressure 175 psig.
- · Actual working pressure 160 psig.

Test:

- OMI M2088 requires confirmation of water flow through inspector's test valve to verify proper operation.
- OMRSD, File VI requires verification of system operational readiness semiannually and at component replacement.

Inspection:

-OMI M6045 requires the inspection of the firex valves for signs of corrosion and/or contamination.

Failure History:

- Current data on test failures, unexplained anomalies, and other failures experienced during ground
 processing activities can be found in the PRACA database. The PRACA database was researched and no
 failure data was found on this component in the critical failure mode.
- The GIDEP failure data interchange was researched and no failure data was found on this component in the critical failure mode.

Operational Use:

Correcting Action	Timeframe
There is no action which can be taken to mitigate the failure effect.	Since no correcting action is available,
	timeframe does not apply.